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Project Summary  
The purpose of this research was to improve the understanding of the Development 
Test and Evaluation (DT&E) cybersecurity testing to minimize cybersecurity 
vulnerabilities prior to fielding equipment and systems to the operational forces.  The 
research included case studies of two existing United States Marine Corps (USMC) 
systems, lab testing in a test bed developed at the Naval Postgraduate School to fine-
tune suggestions for DT&E, and a study of system-of-systems testing. Opportunities to 
improve resilience were determined and offensive-type laboratory testing is 
recommended.   Keywords: Development Test and Evaluation (DT&E), Test and 
Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP), cybersecurity, Risk Management Framework (RMF), 
System of Systems (SoS), C4, C4I). 
Background 
“Risks associated with vulnerabilities inherent in information technology (IT) must be 
considered throughout the system development life cycle for all IT used or operated on 
behalf of the Department of Defense (DoD) (Department of Defense, 2014).” In 
addition, IT interconnections must be managed so that the security posture of one 
system does not impose risk on others (Department of Defense, 2014).  
The DODI 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, “assigns, reinforces, 
and prescribes procedures for acquisition responsibilities related to cybersecurity in the 
Defense Acquisition System (Department of Defense, 2015).” The most recent update 
details the program manager’s responsibilities for cybersecurity from the exploratory 
phase through all phases of acquisition (Department of Defense, 2015).  Chapter 8 of 
the Defense Acquisition Guidebook requires an “affordable test and evaluation (T&E) 
program that enables the Department of Defense (DOD) to acquire systems that work 
(Defense Acquisition University, 2017).” According to Chapter 8-3.1 of the Defense 
Acquisition Guidebook, Development Test and Evaluation (DT&E) is the disciplined 
process of generating substantiated knowledge on the capabilities and limitations of 
systems, subsystems, components, software, and materiel (Defense Acquisition 
University, 2017).  Note that DT&E also supports the cybersecurity assessments of 
NPS NRP Executive Summary 
 
Title: Understanding Development Test and Evaluation (DT&E) Implications for Cyber 
Report Date: 03/01/2017 Project Number (IREF ID): NPS-N16-M405-A 
 
Naval Postgraduate School / School: GSOIS/CS 
Page 2 of 6 
 
Deleted: -FY17-
security controls and the authorization to operate in compliance with the Risk 
Management Framework (RMF) (Department of Defense, 2014).   
This research effort explored the implications of cybersecurity DT&E with respect to 
Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Command, Control, Communications, 
Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) systems.  Case studies also explored where systems 
under test were determined to be most vulnerable to adverse cyber actions. The Marine 
Corps Civil Information Management System (MARCIMS) and Common Aviation 
Command and Control System (CAC2S) were selected for case study analysis because 
both programs underwent DT&E following the release in April 2013 of the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense (DT&E) Guidelines for Cybersecurity (Office of the DASD 
(DT&E), 2013)   
It is important to note that this research began prior to the recent changes to DODI 
5000.02 that explicitly addressed cybersecurity responsibilities throughout the life cycle 
of the system. Per the 2017 updates, “Program managers use DT&E activities to manage 
and mitigate risks during development, to verify that products are compliant with 
contractual and operational requirements, and to inform decision makers throughout 
the program life cycle (Department of Defense, 2015).” DT&E also provides program 
engineers an opportunity in a development environment to identify cybersecurity 
vulnerabilities that could jeopardize the operational delivery of the system. This gives 
the program manager an opportunity to address the cyber concerns earlier in the life 
cycle before a cyber risk becomes a program risk due to cost and schedule impacts.  
Program managers must develop a Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) “as the 
primary planning and management tool for the integrated test program” to include 
DT&E activities (Department of Defense, 2015) such as vulnerability testing and 
evaluation and specific test events for components and interfaces that need “specific 
attention” based on criticality and vulnerability analysis (Department of Defense, 2015).  
Findings and Conclusions (to include Process) 
The students’ research focused on case studies and a laboratory experiment to identify 
improvements to cyber DT&E. The studies were limited due to the classified nature of 
the cybersecurity testing results and program documentation.  Although MARCIMS and 
CAC2S were both developed using previous editions of policies, namely DoDD 8500.01 
(Department of Defense, 2002), DoDI 8500.02 (Department of Defense, 2003), DoDI 
8510.01 (Department of Defense, 2007), and DoDI 5000.02 (Department of Defense, 
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2008), the requirements to develop a TEMP, address cybersecurity testing in the TEMP, 
and perform security testing were not new requirements (Department of Defense, 
2012).  “Historically, TEMPs and associated test plans have not adequately addressed 
cybersecurity measures or resources (Department of Defense, 2015).”  
MARCIMS and CAC2S were selected for case study analysis because both programs 
underwent DT&E following the release in April 2013 of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense (DT&E) Guidelines for Cybersecurity (Office of the DASD (DT&E), 2013).  Because 
of the security limitations previously mentioned, the research examined the test 
strategy documents developed for MARCMS and CAC2S to extrapolate opportunities to 
improve the cyber DT&E plans for future programs.   
A third case study examined how the USMC should conduct cybersecurity DT&E on 
system of systems (SoS) since most military systems are part of a SoS.  The research 
recognized the need to also plan for and execute cyber assessments in preparation for 
cyber DT&E of system modifications to mitigate program risk.     
This research also included lab experimentation to be recommended for inclusion in 
future DT&E events. A honeypot was established online for MARCIMS in a laboratory 
environment with the goal of understanding how hackers would or could attempt to 
circumvent cybersecurity measures to exploit the system. This type of testing was more 
offensive than defensive because this might expose if someone was inappropriately 
attempting to circumvent security controls.  Capturing the system state before and after 
placing the honeypot online provided indications of any system changes or attempts 
during its exposure on the internet. Network traffic to and from the honeypot was also 
captured providing additional insight into the attacks, both successful and unsuccessful.  
A MACIMS user device was placed on the Internet with no firewall or other external 
security measures in place.  Over approximately 45 days, numerous attacks were 
launched on the device and the associated wireless router.  Networks tools like Snort 
and Wireshark were used to understand how the device was exploited.  Port scans 
conducted before and after the honeypot operations indicated that new ports were 
opened on the MARCIMS device indicating potential compromise.  Adding this type of a 
scenario to DT&E allows the systems cybersecurity engineering team to eliminate or 
mitigate these vulnerabilities prior to delivery of the operational system.  
The case study analysis determined that the MARCIMS and CAC2S Program Offices 
understand cybersecurity risks and have improved their system resilience prior to 
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production and deployment. However, there were areas identified where the systems’ 
resilience could be further enhanced. The examined case studies highlighted process 
and procedures that are advantageous to developing a secure information system.  The 
laboratory testing used vulnerability scanners, intrusion detection systems, and a 
honeypot exposed to the Internet to demonstrate how seemingly secure systems might 
be vulnerable. These areas and the interpretation of the lab testing results will be 
detailed in the students’ thesis to be delivered to MCTSSA upon completion in 
September, 2017. 
The findings of this thesis can be integrated with the command requirements to aid 
MCTSSA’s mission of conduction DT&E for USMC and joint service C4I systems. 
Furthermore, the thesis will be applicable to the entire DoD because all services must 
consider and plan for cyber-related DT&E for acquisition programs per the Defense 
Acquisition Guidebook (Defense Acquisition University, 2017).  
 Recommendations for Further Research 
Additional case studies could be developed and analyzed, specifically for USMC C4I 
programs that underwent DT&E since the transition to the RMF and the updated 
acquisition policies and guidelines.  A more in-depth study of system of systems, to 
include end-to-end cybersecurity testing in accordance with the latest policies, would 
also be beneficial.   
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